This paper deals with broadcast encryption schemes, in which a sender can send information securely to a group of receivers excluding some receivers over a broadcast channel. In this paper we propose modifications of the Complete Subtree (CS), the Subset Difference (SD) and the Layered Subset Difference (LSD) methods based on the Master Key Tree (MKT). Our modifications eliminate log N keys or labels from receivers' storage, in exchange for an increase in the computational overhead, where N is the total number of receivers. We also propose modifications of the SD and LSD methods by applying the Trapdoor One-way Permutation Tree (TOPT) which is originally proposed in order to modify the CS method. Our modifications based on TOPT also eliminate log N labels, and the computational cost is much smaller than MKT based methods. key words: broadcast encryption, stateless receiver, complete subtree, subset difference, master key, trapdoor one-way permutation
Introduction
This paper deals with broadcast encryption schemes or revocation schemes, in which a sender can distribute secret information securely to a group of receivers excluding specified receivers (called revoked receivers) over a broadcast channel. One of the main applications of the broadcast encryption technology is digital rights management (DRM) of copyrighted contents. An example is a content protection scheme with recordable media [7] , in which a session key to encrypt or decrypt the contents stored on a medium can be retrieved only by authorized receivers (i.e. players or recorders) having collect receiver keys. If these receiver keys are stolen or exposed, these keys are revoked from the system, and as a result the receiver that has possessed the exposed keys will not be able to retrieve session keys from media which are produced after the revocation.
There exist two simple methods to realize a broadcast encryption scheme. The first method is called the one key method. After giving a unique key to each receiver, a sender broadcasts secret information encrypted under each of the keys possessed by unrevoked receivers. The advantage of this method is the storage overhead, i.e. a receiver must store only one key. However, the sender must transmit N − r ciphertexts, where N and r denote the total number of receivers in the system and the number of revoked receivers, respectively. Therefore this method is impractical if N is large. † The author is with Sony Corporation, Tokyo, 141-0001 Japan. a) E-mail: tomo@arch.sony.co.jp * Parts of this work were published in [2] and [3] .
The other method is called the one message method, which is sometimes also called the power set method, since it defines a power set of N receivers, i.e. {S b 1 ···b i ···b N }. Each b i ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether or not receiver i belongs to subset S b 1 ···b i ···b N . In the setup phase, the subset key corresponding to a subset is given to receivers which belong to the subset. In the transmission phase, a sender chooses an appropriate subset key and encrypts the secret information with it, then broadcasts the ciphertext. The communication overhead of this method is minimal: only one message must be broadcast. However each receiver is required to store 2 N−1 keys since it belongs to 2 N−1 subsets, thus it is also impractical for a large N. Hence, we need more efficient and practical solutions.
Related Work
We have some important criteria for evaluation of broadcast encryption technology. As mentioned above, the upper bound of the number of ciphertexts to be broadcast (the communication overhead) and the number of keys each receiver stores (the storage overhead) are ones of them. Another criterion we should consider is the computational overhead at each receiver. It should be noted that usually administrators and broadcasters are assumed to have much greater memory and computing resources than receivers.
Berkovits [5] and Fiat et al. [8] independently introduced the notion of broadcast encryption. Berkovits used a secret sharing scheme for construction of a broadcast encryption scheme. The storage overhead of this scheme is minimal, i.e. a receiver stores only one key. However, the communication overhead is O (N). Fiat et al. combined their 1-resilient methods hierarchically in order to construct an r-resilient method which is resistant to any collusion of at most r revoked receivers. The communication overhead of their r-resilient method is O r 2 log 2 r log N , and the storage overhead is O r log r log N . Wallner et al. [14] and Wong et al. [15] independently proposed efficient methods for key distribution, using a logical key-tree structure. Their methods assign a receiver to a leaf of a tree, and give the receiver log N + 1 node keys corresponding to nodes on the path from the leaf to the root. Note that log N keys of them which are corresponding to internal nodes are shared by other receivers. In order to revoke a receiver, each unrevoked receiver updates all node keys which had been shared by the revoked one. For this sake, a sender broadcasts 2 log N ciphertexts, when a binary Copyright c 2005 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers Table 1 The properties of CS, SD, BLSD and their modifications. N, r and M denote the total number of receivers, the number of revoked receivers and the modulus of RSA cryptosystem, respectively. † The computational overhead in CS is log log N lookups, and that in SD and BLSD is log N applications of a pseudo-random generator.
CS [10]
CS-MKT CS-TOPT [12] , [13] 
tree is used. After all unrevoked receivers have updated the node key of the root, the sender can transmit secret information using only one ciphertext, which is encrypted with the renewed root key. Methods proposed in [14] and [15] assume that receivers are state relevant, i.e. receivers can change their keys. There are two challenging problems for such receivers: how to change their keys securely, and how to synchronize with the sender and other receivers. Of course there are several solutions, but they might increase the production cost or be impractical for general receivers such as DVD players. Therefore broadcast encryption methods which allow receivers without the ability to update their key are preferred for many applications. Such receivers are called stateless receivers. If receivers are state relevant, they can change and store keys established by the sender and these receivers, and use them afterwards to obtain a session key at each transmission. It may reduce the communication overhead. On the other hand, stateless receivers must use the keys given at the initial stage forever. Hence every transmission must contain sufficient information for all unrevoked receivers with initial keys to obtain the session key.
The notion of stateless receivers was introduced by Naor et al. [10] , who also proposed two efficient methods suitable for such receivers using a binary key-tree structure. The Complete Subtree (CS) method is a direct application of the structure proposed in [14] and [15] for stateless receivers. The Subset Difference (SD) method improves the subset algorithm and key assignment mechanism of CS using a pseudo-random sequence generator. Halevy et al. [9] introduced the concept of layer in order to reduce the storage overhead of SD, and proposed two Layered Subset Difference (LSD) methods -the Basic LSD (BLSD) and the General LSD (GLSD) methods. We will briefly explain CS, SD and LSD in Sections 3, 4 and 5, as well as our modifications.
Recently, Nojima et al. [12] and Ogata et al. [13] independently proposed modifications of CS. They used trapdoor one-way permutations based on RSA cryptosystem in order to reduce the number of node keys a receiver stores to one. As we will see in Sections 4 and 5, we apply their concepts to SD and LSD in order to reduce the number of labels a receiver stores.
Our Contribution
In this paper we present two cryptographic tree structures, the Master Key Tree (MKT) and the Trapdoor One-way Permutation Tree (TOPT) which can be used in order to reduce receivers' storage in CS, SD and LSD. Note that TOPT was originally proposed by Nojima et al. [12] and Ogata et al. [13] in order to modify CS. In this paper we propose modifications of CS, SD and LSD based on MKT, and modifications of SD and LSD using TOPT. Table 1 summarizes the properties (the upper bound of the number of broadcast ciphertexts, the number of labels a receiver stores, the computational overhead at a receiver, and the number of public values in the method) of CS, SD, BLSD and their modifications using MKT (denoted by CS-MKT, SD-MKT and BLSD-MKT, respectively), and using TOPT (denoted by CS-TOPT, SD-TOPT and BLSD-TOPT, resp.). Note that CS-MKT was originally proposed in [2] , and SD-MKT and BLSD-MKT were in [3] . Our modifications eliminate log N keys or labels from receivers' storage while maintaining the same communication complexity, in exchange for an increase in the computational overhead. The computational overhead and the number of public values in modifications based on TOPT are smaller than those in MKT based modifications.
It should be noted that Attrapadung et al. [4] generalized the key generation mechanism of SD and LSD with pseudo-random sequence generators. Their method eliminates log N − x u labels from the storage of receiver u (1 ≤ u ≤ N − 1) in SD, and log N − x u − y u labels in BLSD, where x u = max{k : 2 k |u} and
Since their method does not use any public-key cryptography based primitive, the computational overhead at a receiver is smaller than that of ours. In comparison, the advantage of our modifications is the number of labels which can be eliminated -ours eliminates log N labels from the storage of all receivers in all methods.
Underlying Tree Structures
In this section we present the basic tree structure and two cryptographic structures which are used for reducing receivers' storage in CS, SD and LSD.
The Basic Tree Structure
For all methods discussed below except for ones with explicit description, we assume that the total number of receivers N is a power of 2. These methods use a binary tree with N leaves. Note that the base of function "log" is 2, throughout this paper. Let l ∈ T denote that node l is included in tree T . In order to represent relationships of nodes, let P (l), S (l), LC (l) and RC (l) denote the parent, sibling, left-child and right-child node of node l, respectively.
Consider a binary tree with N leaves. Each node is numbered l (l = 1, 2, . . . , 2N − 1) where the root is 1 and other nodes are numbered with breadth first order from left to right. Each node has node value NV l (l = 1, . . . , 2N − 1). Each leaf is also represented by leaf number leaf m (m = 1, . . . , N), where the left most leaf is leaf 1 . Thus leaf leaf m equals to node N −1+m. Let path m be the path from the root to leaf m . Figure 1 illustrates a binary tree with 16 leaves.
The Master Key Tree
Chick et al. [6] proposed the master key technique for access control of hiearchically structured services by modifying the user-hiearchy scheme proposed by Akl et al. [1] . The Master Key Tree (MKT) is a key-tree structure based on a binary tree and the master key technique with the following properties.
Prime p l (l = 1, . . . , 2N −1) is assigned to node l, where p l 1 p l 2 for l 1 l 2 . Let M be a modulus of RSA cryptosystem, and K be an element in Z * M chosen randomly. The node value for node l is defined as 
The Trapdoor One-Way Permutation Tree
The Trapdoor One-way Permutation Tree (TOPT) is a structure using a binary tree and trapdoor one-way permutations with the following properties. Note that RSA cryptosystem is used for construction of TOPT in [12] and [13] . Let M, e and d be a modulus, a public exponent and a secret exponent of RSA, respectively. Node value NV 1 for the root is an element randomly chosen from Z * M . Node values for other nodes l (l = 2, . . . , 2N − 1) are defined as
where H TOPT is a hash function which uniformly maps values of arbitrary length into |M|-bit strings.
Modifications of the CS Method
In this section we give brief explanations about CS and its modifications using MKT and TOPT. Let Trusted Center (TC) denote the entity which is the controller and also the sender of the broadcast encryption scheme.
The CS Method
C , where C denotes the key length of symmetric encryption algorithm E. These node values are directly used as node keys NK l , i.e. NK l = NV l (l = 1, . . . , 2N − 1). Receiver u m is given a set of node keys corresponding to the nodes on path m . Therefore each receiver stores log N + 1 keys.
In order to broadcast secret information I to all receivers excluding some revoked ones, TC finds the Steiner Tree S T (R) which is the minimal subtree of the original tree containing the root and all leaves in R, where R is a set of leaves such that receivers assgined to them are revoked. Then TC broadcasts cipertexts {E NK l (I) | l S T (R) , P (l) ∈ S T (R)}. It has been reported in [10] that the number of broadcast ciphertexts for a transmission of I including a revocation of r (= |R|) receivers is at most r log (N/r).
Modification Using MKT
We can reduce the number of keys a receiver stores in CS to one, using MKT as follows. TC generates MKT and publishes M and p l (l = 1, . . . , 2N − 1). TC also defines node keys NK l (l = 1, . . . , 2N − 1) as NK l = H (NV l ), where H is a public pairwise independent hash function [10] which maps |M|-bit elements into C-bit strings. Then TC gives master value MV m to receiver u m . It enables u m to derive any node key NK l such that the corresponding node l is located on path m as NK l = H MV w m /p l m mod M . Therefore, this modification, called CS-MKT, reduces the number of keys a receiver stores from log N + 1 to one.
Note that since MKT is based on RSA, the size of node value NV l is equal to the size of a secure RSA modulus (e.g. 1024 bits). On the other hand, encryption algorithm E requires a shorter key (e.g. 128 bits) as node key NK l . Hence we use hash function H to shorten the node value into a Cbit value. This is also the case in the modification using TOPT.
Modification Using TOPT
The original versions of this modification, which we call CS-TOPT, were proposed by Nojima et al. [12] and Ogata et al. [13] independently. TC generates TOPT and publishes M, e and H TOPT . Similar to CS-MKT, TC defines node keys NK l (l = 1, . . . , 2N − 1) for all nodes as NK l = H (NV l ). TC gives node value NV m of leaf leaf m to receiver u m . It enables u m to derive all node keys NK l of nodes l on path m , one by one from the leaf to the root, since we have NV l/2 = NV e l − H TOPT (l) mod M from the definition of node values in TOPT. Therefore, CS-TOPT also reduces the number of keys a receiver stores to one.
Modifications of the SD Method
MKT and TOPT are also useful to modify SD in order to reduce receivers' storage overhead. After giving a brief explanation of SD, we present its modifications.
The SD Method
Subset S i, j used in SD is specified by two nodes, i and j, and defined as S i, j = S i \S j , where S i and S j are sets of receivers assigned to the leaves of the subtree rooted at nodes i and j, respectively. SD defines all subsets S i, j such that i is an ancestor of j.
SD uses the concept of label. Label LABEL i, j of subset S i, j is used to derive the corresponding subset key S K i, j and other labels LABEL i,k , where k is a descendant of j. It also uses a pseudo-random sequence generator for generation of subset keys. Given a C-bit input, generator G outputs a 3C-bit sequence. Let G L (s), G M (s) and G R (s) denote the left, middle and right third of the output of generator G on seed s, respectively. For each internal node i, TC randomly chooses element s i ∈ {0, 1} C , feeds it into generator G and Note that if a receiver has label LABEL i, j , it can derive any label LABEL i,k and the corresponding subset key S K i,k such that k is equal to j or its descendant, since generator G is public. Receiver u m assigned to leaf leaf m stores labels LABEL i, j specified by two nodes i and j, such that i is a node on path m and j is a descendant of i just hanging off path m .
It is sufficient for the receiver to derive any subset key corresponding to a subset to which it belongs. The number of labels a receiver stores (including a label for the case where no receivers are revoked) is 1 2 log 2 N + 1 2 log N + 1. In order to broadcast secret information I, TC finds a collection of subsets {S l q | S l q = S i, j , q = 1, 2, . . .} such that the union of these subsets covers all unrevoked receivers but no revoked ones, then broadcast ciphertexts E S K lq (I). It has been shown in [10] that the number of broadcast ciphertexts for a transmission of I including a revocation of r receivers is at most 2r − 1.
Concept of Our Modifications
We can observe some facts about SD. One of them is that if a receiver belongs to subset S i, j then it also belongs to subset S P(i),S (i) . Another fact is that there are two cases in which a label is obtained by a receiver: label LABEL i, j is (case I) directly given to the receiver by TC, or (case II) derived from another label using generator G by the receiver. However, there only exists case I for special labels LABEL i, j , such that i is the parent of j. In other words, special labels are not derived from another label by a receiver.
For each internal node i on path m for receiver u m , there is exactly one choice for j such that u m belongs to subset S i, j and i is the parent of j. Therefore a receiver stores log N special labels. We apply MKT and TOPT to these special labels and the label which corresponds to the subset including all receivers, in order to eliminate log N labels from receivers' storage.
Note that the above observation tells that non-special label LABEL i, j such that i is an ancestor but not the parent of j is sometimes derived from another label using generator G by a receiver. In order to apply the master key technique [6] used in MKT or the technique based on trapdoor one-way permutations [12] , [13] used in TOPT to the non-special labels, the value generated by these techniques must be equal to the output of G. However it is difficult to achieve, so we do not apply these techniques to the non-special labels.
It should also be noted that the master key technique can be directly applied to all subset keys in SD. In this construction generator G is not used and all subset keys are derived using the master key technique. Namely, it assigns prime p i, j to subset S i, j , and defines subset key S K i, j in a similar way as CS-MKT. However, each receiver requires O (N) primes for derivation of subset keys since it belongs to O (N) subsets, and it increases the storage overhead for storing these primes or the computational overhead for generating them. Moreover, the computational cost to derive a subset key becomes significantly larger than MKT based methods proposed in this paper due to the number of primes in the master key system. We have not adopted this construction since the storage and computational overhead does not satisfy our requirement of seeking practical solutions.
Modification Using MKT
Let SD-MKT denote the modification of SD using MKT presented in this section. It consists of three phases: Setup, Broadcasting and Decryption.
Setup
TC generates MKT and publishes modulus M, primes p l (l = 1, . . . , 2N − 1), generator G and hash function H. TC also defines subsets S i, j such that j is a descendant of i. Note that these subsets are the same as in SD. Let S S i,k denote a special subset such that i is the parent of k among the subsets defined above. Since each node except for the root has one parent node, each k (k = 2, 3, . . . , 2N − 1) appears exactly once in representations of all special subsets S S i,k . TC also defines subset S 1,φ including all receivers for the case where there are no revocations. TC defines intermediate labels IL 1,φ for subset S 1,φ , and IL i,k for special subsets S S i,k . Then TC sets the values of the intermediate labels with the node values in MKT, as IL 1,φ = NV 1 and IL P(k),S (k) = NV k for k = 2, . . . , 2N − 1. Note that the latter is also described as IL k,2k = NV 2k+1 and IL k,2k+1 = NV 2k for k = 1, . . . , N − 1. Labels of these subsets are defined as LABEL 1,φ = H IL 1,φ and LABEL i,k = H IL i,k . Labels corresponding to special subsets are called special labels. Using generator G and special labels LABEL i,k , TC generates all labels LABEL i, j for all subsets S i, j . This process is the same as in SD.
For receiver u m , TC tentatively selects labels which are given to u m in SD. These are labels LABEL i, j for subsets S i, j such that i is an internal node on path m and j is a descendant node of i just hanging off path m . Note that we put label LABEL 1,φ away for a while. Among the tentatively selected labels, TC gives non-special labels to u m . In addition, TC gives master value MV m to u m . As mentioned afterward, label LABEL 1,φ and special labels can be derived from master value MV m , hence the receiver does not need to store these labels. 
Broadcasting
The way for transmission of secret information I including a revocation of some receivers is the same as in SD. Note that subset key S K i, j corresponding to subset S i, j is derived from label LABEL i, j in the same way as SD, i.e. S K i, j = G M LABEL i, j .
Decryption
An unrevoked receiver belongs to a subset corresponding to the subset key used for encryption in the broadcasting phase. The way for the receiver to find a ciphertext to decrypt is the same as in SD. After finding an appropriate ciphertext, the receiver derives the subset key from its master value or a label it stores then decrypts the ciphertext. The derivation of the subset key is performed as follows.
If no receivers are revoked and subset key S K 1,φ is used, receiver u m computes intermediate label 
Modification Using TOPT
TOPT is also useful to modify SD. The modification of SD using TOPT, which we call SD-TOPT, is similar to but slightly different from SD-MKT as described below.
In the setup phase, TC generates TOPT instead of MKT, and publishes modulus M, exponent e and hash functions H and H TOPT .
Instead of master value MV m , TC gives intermediate label IL P(n),S (n) to receiver u m , where n is the leaf to which u m is assigned. Thus, in the example depicted in Fig. 2 , receiver u 4 is given intermediate label IL 9, 18 .
In the decryption phase, receiver u m checks the current case. If the situation is case (b), u m derives intermediate label IL i,k corresponding to special label LABEL i,k from its intermediate label IL P(n),S (n) as follows. If i = P (n) and j = k = S (n), then u m already has IL i,k . Otherwise, it computes intermediate label IL P(P(n)),S (P(n)) = IL P(n),S (n) e − H TOPT (n) mod M. By repeating this operation, u m can compute any intermediate label corresponding to a special subset to which u m belongs. Namely,
IL P(P(t)),S (P(t)) = IL P(t),S (t)
e − H TOPT (t) mod M, where t is a node on path m . Note that if no receivers are revoked and subset key S K 1,φ is used, it is case (b) for all receivers. Intermediate label IL 1,φ is derived from IL 1,2 or IL 1,3 as
e − H TOPT (2) mod M. The process after obtaining IL i,k is the same as in SD-MKT.
Modifications of the LSD Method
The mechanisms for modifying SD using MKT or TOPT are directly applicable to BLSD and GLSD.
The Basic LSD Method
Suppose that log 1/2 N is an integer. BLSD defines the level of the root and every level of depth h log 1/2 N for h = 1, 2, . . . , log 1/2 N as special. BLSD also defines the collection of levels between (and including) adjacent special levels as a layer.
Recall that SD defines all subsets S i, j such that node j is a descendant of i. Subset S i, j defined in BLSD satisfies at least one of the following additional conditions: both i and j belong to the same layer, or i is located at a special level. Namely, BLSD adopts stricter conditions which reduces the total number of subsets in the method, and also the number of labels a receiver stores. It has been reported in [3] that the number of labels a receiver stores in BLSD is log 3/2 N + 1. Consider two nodes i and j such that j is a descendant of i but do not satisfy either of the above two conditions. Subset S i, j is defined in SD and one ciphertext under subset key S K i, j is broadcast for receivers belonging to S i, j . On the other hand, in BLSD, it is not defined and must be represented using two defined subsets as S i, j = S i,k ∪ S k, j , where k is the first node on the path from i to j which is located at a special level. Hence two ciphertexts under S K i,k and S K k, j are broadcast for these receivers. As a result, the communication overhead of BLSD becomes at most twice that of SD.
The General LSD Method
While BLSD uses only one kind of special levels, GLSD uses several kinds of special levels and stricter conditions for subsets. Halevy et al. [9] have provided explanation using a line graph as follows.
The path from the root to a leaf in a tree is considered as a line graph. A node in the graph, which corresponds to a node in the tree, is represented by its distance from the root, Note that the number of trailing zeroes in the representation of node i determines how special it is. j of defined subset S i, j can be any node from i + 1 to the first node which is even more special than i, inclusive.
While a subset defined in SD is represented as a disjoint union of at most two defined subsets in BLSD, it is represented using at most d subsets in GLSD. It means that at most d ciphertexts are broadcast as a substitute for one ciphertext in SD, therefore the communication overhead of GLSD is d times larger. As we enlarge parameter d, the number of labels a receiver stores decreases, and finally it becomes O log 1+ N , where > 0 is an arbitrary value.
Modifications of the LSD Method
In modifications of BLSD and GLSD with MKT, receiver u m has master value MV m which can derive any special label corresponding to a special subset to which u m belongs. In modifications using TOPT, receiver u m is given intermediate label IL P(n),S (n) which can derive these special labels one by one from the bottom to the top, where n is the leaf to which u m is assigned. We avoid giving a detailed construction of our modifications of BLSD and GLSD, since they are almost the same as the modifications of SD. Recall that the difference between SD and BLSD or GLSD is the conditions for subsets. The original conditions are also adopted in our modifications. Therefore, subsets defined in ours are exactly the same as those in BLSD and GLSD.
Let us consider the example illustrated in Fig. 2 again in order to describe our modifications of BLSD. There exist three special levels: the level of the root, nodes 4 to 7, and the leaves. In the original BLSD, receiver u 4 stores nine labels: LABEL 1,φ and eight labels LABEL i, j such that (i, j) = {(1, 3), (1, 5) , (1, 8) , (1, 18) , (2, 5) , (4, 8) , (4, 18) , (9, 18 )}. On the other hand, receiver u 4 stores only four labels (LABEL 1, 5 , LABEL 1, 8 , LABEL 1, 18 and LABEL 4, 18 ) and master value MV 4 (in BLSD-MKT) or intermediate label IL 9, 18 (in BLSD-TOPT). Labels LABEL 1,3 , LABEL 2,5 , LABEL 4, 8 , LABEL 9, 18 and LABEL 1,φ can be derived from MV 4 or IL 9,18 .
Discussion

Security
In our modifications of SD and LSD, the subset keys are generated in three steps: (Step 1) special label LABEL i,k for special subset S S i,k is generated using MKT or TOPT, (Step 2) label LABEL i, j for non-special subset S i, j is derived from the special label with generator G, then (Step 3) subset key S K i, j is computed from special label LABEL i,k or nonspecial label LABEL i, j using G.
CS-MKT was proposed in [2] , with security analysis based on Akl et al.'s discussion [1] . Namely, assuming that "If factors of M are unknown, then computing p th roots (mod M) for integral p > 1 is difficult." related to RSA, it is difficult for any coalition of receivers to obtain node value NV l such that no receiver in the coalition is assigned to a leaf which is descendant of node l.
On the other hand, variations of CS-TOPT were originally proposed by Nojima et al. [12] and Ogata et al. [13] independently. Nojima et al. used a bit-wise xor operation instead of an addition for construction of TOPT and demonstrated that their variation of CS-TOPT is secure if RSA is secure. Namely, if there exists polynomial-time algorithm A that outputs a node value which is not known to any of the colluding revoked receivers, given all node values known to the coalition with probability P A , we can construct polytime algorithm B that computes x d mod M for any x with probability P B ≥ 2 N P A . Ogata et al. constructed TOPT without using hash function H TOPT , and showed that security of their scheme is still equivalent to RSA.
Let LSD-MKT (respectively LSD-TOPT) denote the modification of LSD using MKT (resp. TOPT). The analysis in [2] (resp. [12] , [13] ) can be directly applicable to SD/LSD-MKT (resp. SD/LSD-TOPT) in order to claim the security of the intermediate labels IL i,k . Special label LABEL i,k is derived from the intermediate label as
Since the output of H is pairwise independent, it is difficult for any coalition with no receivers belonging to special subset S S i,k to obtain the corresponding label LABEL i,k .
Then label LABEL i,k is fed into generator G in Step 2 in order to derive label LABEL i, j for non-special subset S i, j , such that j is a descendant of k, in the same way as in SD and LSD. The process in Step 3 is also the same as in the original. The discussion on security of SD given in [10] is applicable to Steps 2 and 3 in order to show indistinguishability of subset keys in our modifications. To conclude, we say that our modifications are secure against any coalition of revoked receivers if RSA is secure.
Communication Overhead
Since our modifications adopt the same way for sending secret information as the original methods, the communication overhead is also the same. Namely, the upper bound of the number of ciphertexts in modifications of CS, SD, BLSD and GLSD are r log (N/r), 2r − 1, 4r − 2 and O (r), respectively. Each broadcast ciphertext is an encryption of secret information I under a node key or a subset key. For example, we can use a secure block cipher with the block size |I| and the key size C, in order to keep the size of each ciphertext in |I|.
Storage and Computational Overhead
We first consider the size of secure memory at a receiver which is used to store keys or labels. A receiver in CS-MKT/TOPT stores only one master value or intermediate label. As reported in [3] , a receiver in SD and LSD stores log N special labels. In our modifications, these labels and label LABEL 1,φ are derived from the master value or the intermediate label, therefore log N labels are eliminated from the receiver's storage. See Table 1 for the exact number of keys or labels a receiver stores.
Since MKT and TOPT are based on RSA, the size of the master value and the intermediate label is equal to the size of a secure RSA modulus. As an example, if we set parameters as the total number of receivers N = 2 25 , the size of a node key and a label |NK l | = |LABEL i, j | = C = 128 bits and the size of a master value and an intermediate label |MV m | = |IL i, j | = |M| = 1024 bits, then the size of the secure memory of the receiver in our modifications is about 70%, 5.5% and 14% smaller than in CS, SD and BLSD, respectively. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the number of receivers (in log) and the size of keys or labels a receiver stores (in bits) in these methods and our modifications under the same parameters.
Next, we consider an increase in the size of memory which does not need secrecy, and the computational overhead. MKT uses 2N − 1 primes. Each of them is assigned to a node (in CS-MKT), a special subset or subset S 1,φ (in other MKT based methods). A receiver needs log N + 1 of them. There are some options for the receiver to deal with these primes. In order to store log N + 1 primes directly, the receiver needs storage of O log 2 N bits. The receiver may generate the primes it needs in an on-the-fly manner, using a primality testing algorithm. The computational overhead for generation of these primes for the receiver is O log 5 N , if it uses the Miller-Rabin algorithm.
After finding these primes, the computational overhead for the receiver for derivation of a node value is O max{log 4 N, log 2 N log 2 M} . In addition, the receiver must perform an evaluation of hash function H in order to derive a node key or a special label from the node value, however we ignore its computational cost since it has been reported in [11] that the computational cost for an evaluation of a pairwise independent hash function is much smaller than modular exponentiation. Therefore, the increased computational cost for a receiver in MKT based methods is O max{log 5 N, log 2 N log 2 M} , if it generates these primes in an on-the-fly manner. We refer to Section 3.3 of [3] for detailed analysis.
On the other hand, a receiver in TOPT based methods only needs the address (location) of the leaf in the tree to which it is assigned as individual non-secret information, which is represented by a log N bit value. Moreover, these methods use only one public exponent e. It is much smaller compared with 2N − 1 primes in MKT based methods. In order to derive a node value, the receiver in TOPT based methods performs at most log N executions of modular exponentiation with index e. Similar to usual RSA applications, we can use a special value for e in order to minimize the computational cost. Thus the cost for an evaluation of modular exponentiation is estimated as O log 2 M . After deriving the targeted node value, the receiver feeds it into hash function H in order to compute a node key or a special label. We ignore its computational cost because of the reason mentioned above. In total, the computational overhead of a receiver in TOPT based methods is O log N log 2 M . It should be noted that a receiver in modifications of SD and LSD must derive a special label only in case (b) in the decryption phase. In addition, in either case (a) or (b), the receiver must derive a subset key from the special label or the non-special label it stores using generator G at most log N times, and this process is the same as in the original methods.
Variations of CS-MKT
There are some variations of CS-MKT. Suppose that the total number of receivers N is a power of integer a satisfying a > 1. These variations use an a-array tree with N leaves. For internal node l (l = 1, . . . , a. TC also defines subset S 1,11···1 including all receivers. This arrangement reduces the communication overhead to r log (N/r) / log a + r.
In a variation, the master key technique is applied to the entire tree. Let B denote b 1 · · · b i · · · b a . Subset key S K l,B for subset S l,B is defined as S K l,B = K W/p l,B mod M, where M is a modulus of RSA, K ∈ Z * M , p l,B is a prime assigned to S l,B , and W is a product of all primes p l,B . Receiver u m is given master value MV m which can derive any subset key for a subset to which u m belongs. The storage overhead in this method is the same as CS-MKT, however the computational overhead is about 2 a times larger. In another variation, the master key technique is applied to each internal node in the tree, thus mod M, where K l ∈ Z * M is a secret element for internal node l, p B is a prime assigned to value B, and W is a product of all primes p B . Receiver u m is given log N log a master values MV m,l , where l is an internal node on path m . MV m,l can derive any subset key S K l,B for subset S l,B to which u m belongs. This method reduces the computational overhead compared with the above one and CS-MKT, however the receiver must store log N log a master values. We refer to [2] for details of these methods.
